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CAVEAT EMPTOR: HOW THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE IMPACTS THE PENN 
CENTRAL TEST AND A BEACHFRONT 
LANDOWNER’S “BUNDLE OF RIGHTS” 
ERIC J. RISLEY, JR.* 
Abstract: Derived from ancient Justinian and English common law, the “public 
trust doctrine” vests ultimate and inalienable ownership of certain tracts of land 
in the state. Many states have incorporated some variation of the public trust doc-
trine into their statutes, constitutions, or common law. The application of the 
public trust doctrine, however, has been challenged as constituting a Fifth 
Amendment regulatory taking of private property under the United States Consti-
tution, giving rise to the need for just compensation. This type of application of 
the public trust doctrine was at issue in the nearly decade-long saga culminating 
in the decision of Palazzolo v. State. The case featured an owner of marshland 
property who sought compensation for Rhode Island’s denial of his repeated de-
velopment requests. The Rhode Island Superior Court in Palazzolo ultimately 
held that the state’s denial of the landowner’s requests did not constitute a regula-
tory taking. This Comment analyzes the role that the public trust doctrine played 
in the court’s weighing of the various factors in a regulatory takings analysis. 
Further, this Comment argues that the public trust doctrine, as applied in 
Palazzolo, represents a tremendously powerful means for states to set aside pub-
lically valuable swaths of land, a means capable of withstanding even a constitu-
tional challenge. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his article Unreasonable Expectations: Why Palazzolo Has No Right to 
Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, Professor of Law Patrick A. Parenteau ob-
served that “[t]he coast is a people magnet.”1 Professor Parenteau further stat-
ed that people have been drawn to coastlines for millennia to engage in com-
merce, recreation, and nearly everything in between.2 As recently as 2010, thir-
ty-nine percent of the U.S. population lived in “coastal shoreline counties.”3 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expectations: Why Palazzolo Has No Right to Turn a Silk 
Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 101, 102 (2002). 
 2 See id. 
 3 NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION REPORT: POPU-
LATION TRENDS FROM 1970 TO 2020, STATE OF THE COAST 3 (2013), http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/
facts/coastal-population-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/FB24-GLG2]. 
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Based on that figure, the population density of “coastal shoreline counties” is 
now over six times greater than the corresponding inland counties.4 
In addition to the human inhabitants that reside there, coastlines are also 
the home of some of the most vibrant ecosystems on earth, such as salt marsh-
es.5 Because these marshes often form where fresh and salt water meet, they 
are essential for healthy fisheries, coastlines, and communities, providing es-
sential food, refuge, or nursery habitat for more than seventy-five percent of 
fishery species.6 Moreover, salt marshes protect coastlines from erosion by 
buffering wave action and trapping sediments, and they also reduce flooding 
by absorbing rainwater.7 Further, marshes are known to improve water quality 
by filtering runoff water and metabolizing excess nutrients.8 
Irrespective of the impact that humans have on marshes by way of devel-
opment, scientists are concerned about the effects that climate change may 
have on marshes—rising sea levels act as a natural threat to marshes across the 
globe.9 Further, the threat to marshes is heightened by “coastal squeeze.”10 
In light of the tension between preserving marshlands and protecting the 
rights of beachfront landowners, state and municipal governments have 
searched for ways to balance these competing interests.11 One such way is the 
“public trust doctrine.”12 The public trust doctrine, however, has not been im-
mune from challenge, particularly from regulatory takings claims.13 A notable 
example of this conflict found its way up to the United States Supreme Court 
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.14 The plaintiff, Anthony Palazzolo, was the own-
er of the parcel at the heart of this case.15 The son of Sicilian immigrants, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. at 5. 
 5 N.H. DEP’T OF ENVTL. SERVS., ENVIRONMENTAL FACTS SHEET: WHAT IS A SALT MARSH? 1 
(2004), http://des.nh.gov/organization/commissioner/pip/factsheets/cp/documents/cp-06.pdf [http://
perma.cc/XYG6-4FLF]. 
 6 What Is a Salt Marsh?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.
gov/facts/saltmarsh.html [http://perma.cc/AEF4-4GTZ]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Karen M. Thorne et al., Ecological Effects of Climate Change on Salt Marsh Wildlife: A 
Case Study from a Highly Urbanized Estuary, 28 J. COASTAL RES. 1477, 1478–79 (2012). 
 10 Id. Salt marshes are typically found at low elevations, and if natural or man-made barriers prohibit 
salt marsh transgression to higher elevations, greater loss of marshlands will occur. Id. This phenomenon 
is known as “coastal squeeze.” See id. 
 11 See Parenteau, supra note 1, at 117–18. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo V), 533 U.S. 606, 618 (2001). The public trust doc-
trine is an ancient common law doctrine that vests ownership rights of certain publically valuable 
tracts of land, such as land beneath tidal and navigable waters, in the states, rather than private enti-
ties, for public use and enjoyment. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892). 
 14 Palazzolo V, 533 U.S. at 618. 
 15 See Anthony Flint, Landlocked on the Coast for 40 Years, Anthony Palazzolo Has Battled R.I. 
Over Property Rights, All the Way to the Supreme Court, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at B1, http://www.
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Palazzolo sought to develop land adjacent to a tidal pond along the Rhode Is-
land coast.16 To do so, he was required to obtain a permit from the state of 
Rhode Island, and was denied several times.17 Following the final denial, 
Palazzolo filed suit, and subsequently carried his case from Rhode Island’s 
Superior Court to the United States Supreme Court.18 This Comment focuses 
on the remand of the Palazzolo case to the Rhode Island Superior Court from 
the Supreme Court, and argues that while the court correctly applied the fac-
tors articulated in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York 
to the case, the result creates a tremendously powerful tool to aid in the protec-
tion of certain swaths of land.19 As a result, this doctrine, as applied in 
Palazzolo, is capable of withstanding even a constitutional challenge.20 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On December 1, 1959, Anthony Palazzolo purchased an undivided one-
half interest in the majority of a property located adjacent to Winnapaug Pond 
in Westerly, Rhode Island.21 The following day, Palazzolo and the other half-
interest owners, Natale Louis and Elizabeth D. Urso, transferred the property 
to Shore Gardens, Inc. (“SGI”).22 Between 1959 and 1961, SGI sold six par-
cels of the property, upon which homes were constructed.23 On May 15, 1969, 
SGI acquired the remaining half-interest on the property.24 
As a 446-acre saltwater tidal pond used for fishing and boating, Winna-
paug Pond’s “size and shallow depth make it a particularly fragile ecosys-
tem.”25 Winnapaug Pond sits adjacent to Palazzolo’s property, approximately 
half of which is below the mean high-water mark.26 In addition, the vast major-
ity of the Palazzolo property is salt marsh, comprised of “Matunuck mucky 
peat,” making the land unable to support construction and thus unsuitable for 
                                                                                                                           
law.uh.edu/faculty/mburke/Classes/Envtl_Land_Use_Fall_2003/Palazzolo_Art_Boston_Globe.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UYB5-LZG7]. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 7, Palazzolo V, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047), 2000 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 665, at *20. 
 18 Flint, supra note 15, at 2; see Palazzolo V, 533 U.S. at 611; Palazzolo v. State (Palazzolo IV), 
746 A.2d 707, 711 (R.I. 2000); Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council (Palazzolo II), 657 A.2d 
1050, 1050 (R.I. 1995); Palazzolo v. State (Palazzolo VI), No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, 
at *12 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005); Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council (Palazzolo III), No. 
C.A. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997). 
 19 See infra notes 79–115 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 21 Palazzolo III, 1997 WL 1526546, at *1. 
 22 Id. at *2. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Palazzolo VI, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *12. 
 26 Id. at *9. 
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development.27 Before any construction could occur, the marsh soil had to be 
removed and replaced with at least six feet of fill, the only exception being a 
small upland area of glacial remains near the pond shoreline, which is connect-
ed to the main road, Atlantic Avenue, by a gravel path.28 There had been no 
developments on any of the marshlands owned by Palazzolo, with the excep-
tion of two houses constructed on a small upland section of glacial remains.29 
In contrast, there had been substantial developments on the lands bordering the 
northern, eastern, and western edges of the pond, some of which involved plac-
ing fill over existing wetlands.30 Nonetheless, there was no evidence that any 
of the properties that required fill were developed without approval from any 
state entity.31 
On March 29, 1962, Palazzolo submitted an application to the State of 
Rhode Island Department of Natural Resources, Division of Harbors and Riv-
ers (“DHR”) to dredge the bottom of Winnapaug Pond and fill his property 
with the dredge, which would make his land suitable for construction.32 The 
application was returned to Palazzolo because it lacked essential information.33 
A little more than a year later, on May 16, 1963, Palazzolo submitted a second 
application to DHR that was largely identical to the first, with the added re-
quest of building a bulkhead on his property.34 After Palazzolo submitted a 
third application on April 29, 1966, seeking to dredge the pond and construct a 
recreational beach facility, DHR approved Palazzolo’s plan, permitting him to 
fill the marsh and either construct a bulkhead or recreational beach facility.35 
Yet, less than a year after issuing its approval of Palazzolo’s plans, DHR re-
voked the permit on November 17, 1971.36 
In 1971, the Coastal Resources Management Council (“CRMC”) suc-
ceeded DHR as the regulator of the state’s coastal wetlands, and adopted the 
Coastal Resources Management Plan (“CRMP”) in 1976, prohibiting the fill-
ing of wetlands without special permission.37 Later, the CRMC revised the 
CRMP to prohibit the filling, removing, or grading of coastal wetlands adja-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at *9–10; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 3. 
 29 Palazzolo VI, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *12. 
 30 Id. at *10–11. 
 31 Id. at *11. 
 32 Palazzolo III, No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 1526546, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at *2–3. A “bulkhead” is a type of coastal structure designed to retain and reinforce upland 
soil from erosion or collapse. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, COASTAL STRUCTURES: TYPES, 
FUNCTIONS AND APPLICATIONS 33–37 (2012), http://www2.housedems.ct.gov/Shore/pubs/2012-08-
15/Coastal_Structure_Presentation_USACE.pdf [https://perma.cc/652J-BQGG]. Bulkheads are com-
monly found on beachfront and coastal properties. See id. 
 35 Palazzolo III, 1997 WL 1526546, at *3. 
 36 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 5. 
 37 Palazzolo III, 1997 WL 1526546, at *3. 
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cent to certain waters, unless the purpose of the change was to preserve or en-
hance the feature as a conservation area.38 
In March of 1983, Palazzolo submitted an application to the CRMC that 
was nearly identical to the original 1962 proposal.39 The request was denied, 
and Palazzolo did not appeal the rejection.40 Palazzolo submitted another ap-
plication to build a recreational beachfront facility in January of 1985 that 
largely mirrored the 1966 application to DHR.41 This application was similarly 
rejected by the CRMC, and Palazzolo filed suit against CRMC in the Rhode 
Island Superior Court on June 15, 1988.42 In this suit, Palazzolo argued that he 
was the owner of the subject property because he was the sole owner of SGI’s 
stock; that a single-family dwelling or recreational beach facility were the only 
viable uses of his property; that CRMC approval was necessary for him to use 
some of his property; and that the CRMC’s two denials constituted a taking of 
his property without just compensation by denying him all beneficial use of his 
land.43 
After Palazzolo’s initial claim was dismissed by the Rhode Island Superi-
or Court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remand-
ed the case back to superior court to evaluate Palazzolo’s takings claims.44 On 
remand, the superior court held that, because Palazzolo could not claim title to 
the land until 1978, and because the regulations that prohibited the filling of 
the wetlands were in place two years prior, Palazzolo could not plausibly argue 
that CRMC’s denial of his application constituted a categorical taking of his 
property, and thus his takings claim was not ripe for review.45 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island upheld the ruling of the court below, and, after 
concluding that Palazzolo’s lack of investment-backed expectations would be 
dispositive under the analysis articulated in Penn Central Transportation 
Company v. City of New York, the court found it unnecessary to consider other 
Penn Central factors.46 Palazzolo appealed the court’s decision, and the United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.47 
Upon review, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Rhode Island’s 
opinion that Palazzolo had not been deprived of all economic uses of his prop-
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id. at *4. 
 39 Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 6. 
 40 Palazzolo III, 1997 WL 1526546, at *4. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at *4–5. 
 43 Id. at *5. 
 44 Palazzolo II, 657 A.2d 1050, 1052 (R.I. 1995); Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council 
(Palazzolo I), No. 86-1496, 1995 WL 941370, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 1995). 
 45 See Palazzolo III, 1997 WL 1526546, at *19. 
 46 Palazzolo IV, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 47 Palazzolo V, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001). 
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erty.48 The Court, however, remanded the decision back to the Supreme Court 
of Rhode Island, holding that the lower court erred in finding that Palazzolo’s 
takings claim was not ripe.49 In finding Palazzolo’s taking claim as ripe for 
review, the Court also instructed the lower court to consider the Penn Central 
takings factors on remand.50 The lower court subsequently remanded the case 
to its original court—the Rhode Island Superior Court—to apply the Penn 
Central factors, resulting in the decision that is the focus of this Comment.51 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Shively v. Bowlby was one of the first instances in which the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the “public trust doctrine.”52 Shively held that the 
title and rights of land below the high-water mark are vested in the government 
for the public benefit.53 Additionally, the Court noted that these rights are 
“governed by the laws of the several States.”54 The Court reasoned that be-
cause lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in 
the way that lands above the high-water mark are, and because such lands are 
of great public value for commerce, navigation, and fishing, there is a compel-
ling public interest in the states maintaining ultimate control over the use of 
such lands.55 This was not necessarily a foreign concept to American jurispru-
dence; the roots of the public trust doctrine reach back to English common 
law: “At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by tide were 
in the King for the benefit of the nation.”56 Once the colonies were settled, 
similar publicly-held rights passed to the colonial governments.57 
In Rhode Island, this very interest is the subject of Article I, Section 17 of 
the state’s constitution, requiring the state to adopt all means necessary and 
proper by law to protect the natural environment along the shoreline for the 
public benefit.58 Rhode Island courts have interpreted Article I, Section 17 as 
establishing the sort of state right and interest in coastal lands described in 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 616. 
 49 Id. at 632. 
 50 Id. at 630; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 51 Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 52 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). 
 53 Id. at 57–58 (noting that the public trust doctrine is an ancient common law doctrine vesting the 
ownership rights of certain tracts of publically valuable land in the states). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 57. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; see Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State, 657 A.2d 1038, 1042 (R.I. 1995) 
(noting that the public trust doctrine is “firmly and pervasively embedded in American jurispru-
dence”). 
 58 R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
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Shively.59 This notion was reaffirmed in Greater Providence Chamber of 
Commerce v. State: “The public-trust doctrine holds that the state holds title to 
all land below the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of 
the public.”60 The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Greater Providence Cham-
ber of Commerce further explained that the purpose of Rhode Island’s version 
of the public trust doctrine is to preserve the public rights of fishing, com-
merce, and navigation.61 
In some instances, the invocations of the public trust doctrine have led to 
takings claims.62 Any takings claim is ultimately rooted in the maxim articulat-
ed in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: “nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”63 Drawing upon 
the notion that government could hardly function if it were required to com-
pensate for every diminution of property value, the United States Supreme 
Court developed a rough, three-part framework for analyzing takings claims in 
Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York.64 In Penn Central, 
the Court held that the enactment of a city-wide law that limited the ability of 
landmark property owners to destroy or fundamentally alter the character of 
the landmarks did not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking for which compen-
sation is owed.65 The tripartite framework growing out of the case focuses on 
the character of the government action, the economic impact of the govern-
ment action or regulation on the claimant, and the extent to which the govern-
ment action has interfered with distinct investment-backed interests or expecta-
tions.66 
The Court noted that although a taking may be more easily found in situa-
tions where the interference with one’s property involves a physical invasion 
by government, the Penn Central factors do not necessary preclude a takings 
claim in the event that a physical invasion has not occurred, pointing to the 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57–58; Champlin’s Realty Assocs., L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 
1165 (R.I. 2003) (noting that the public trust doctrine grants the state title to all land below the high-
water mark for the public benefit); Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 
(R.I. 1999) (explaining that the state’s authority over the land is limited by Article 1, Section 17 of the 
Rhode Island Constitution); Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, 657 A.2d at 1041 (“The 
public trust doctrine holds that the state holds title to all land below the high-water mark in a proprie-
tary capacity for the benefit of the public.”). 
 60 657 A.2d at 1041. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321–22 
(2002); see also Parenteau, supra note 1, at 132 (noting Tahoe-Sierra’s place as the most recent case 
in a line of public trust doctrine takings cases). 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 
(1978). 
 64 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 
(1922). 
 65 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. 
 66 Id. at 124. 
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Court’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.67 Ultimately, the Court in 
Penn Central held that the New York City ordinance protecting certain land-
marks did not constitute a taking because the restrictions it imposed were sub-
stantially related to the promotion of the general welfare, permitted reasonably 
beneficial use of the landmark site, and also afforded the owners opportunities 
to enhance the property.68 
Since announcing the tripartite framework, the Court has been careful to 
note that the three categories of the analysis are intended to serve as guide-
posts, rather than as strict elements.69 Ultimately, all takings analyses may be 
distilled to the maxim contained in Pennsylvania Coal: when a regulation goes 
too far, the courts will consider the regulation a taking.70 This notion, articulat-
ed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Pennsylvania Coal, was later in-
terpreted by the Court in Penn Central as a general commandment to consider 
any facts it feels would be relevant to the inquiry of whether a regulation goes 
too far.71 
The United States Supreme Court utilized the Penn Central analysis again 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, where the Court held that a law 
eliminating all economically beneficial use of land constituted a taking under 
the Fifth Amendment.72 The Court in Lucas explained that takings analyses are 
generally ad hoc, fact-specific inquiries, but also noted: “[W]hen the owner of 
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses 
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically 
idle, he has suffered a taking.”73 The Court also explained, however, that a 
property owner may expect the uses of his property to be restricted by various 
measures enacted by the state in a legitimate use of its police powers.74 In that 
regard, a government action must do no more than duplicate the result that 
could have been achieved in the courts; the Lucas Court thus held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner is 
barred from using land in a manner that has already been prohibited by “exist-
ing rules or understandings.”75 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 127; see Pa. Coal. Co., 260 U.S. at 414 (holding that a Pennsylvania statute effectively 
destroyed the only property rights reserved by the claimant, constituting a taking without just compen-
sation). 
 68 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. 
 69 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002). 
 70 See Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415. 
 71 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Pa. Coal. Co., 260 U.S. at 415. 
 72 Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); see Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 
U.S. at 124. 
 73 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
 74 Id. at 1027. 
 75 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no private property shall be taken for public use without 
just compensation.); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–30. 
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In that vein, the Court determined that it seemed unlikely that common-
law principles would have prevented the owner from developing his beach-
front property.76 The Court also stated, however, that the question of whether 
common-law principles would have prevented the owner from developing his 
property should be answered by the state court, and the Court thus remanded 
Lucas to the lower court to consider whether any principles of South Caroli-
na’s nuisance or property law prohibited the claimant from developing his 
beachfront property.77 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Palazzolo v. State, the Rhode Island Superior Court held that the state’s 
employment of the public trust doctrine to bar Palazzolo from developing his 
land adjacent to Winnapaug Pond did not constitute a regulatory taking, and 
Palazzolo was therefore not owed compensation.78 Even if the state had not 
cited the public trust doctrine, the court held that Palazzolo’s proposed devel-
opment would have constituted a public nuisance, which would preclude 
Palazzolo’s takings claim in its entirety.79 
In weighing the character of the government action, the economic effects 
of the regulations on Palazzolo, and Palazzolo’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, the court was required to confront the question of whether the 
public trust doctrine limited the title of the land originally acquired by Palazzo-
lo.80 The court agreed with the state’s assertion that the public trust doctrine 
applied to Palazzolo’s land because Winnapaug Pond is a tidal body of water, 
and because approximately half of his property sits below the mean high-water 
mark.81 Moreover, the court did not find any evidence on the record to suggest 
that the state had modified the applicability of the public trust doctrine to 
Palazzolo’s property.82 Turning to the further takings analysis mandated by the 
United States Supreme Court, the court noted that the public trust doctrine sub-
stantially impacted Palazzolo’s title to the land, even if it did not serve as a 
total bar to his takings claim.83 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Palazzolo VI, No. 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 108, at *59 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 5, 2005). 
 79 Id. at *24 (“Because clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Palazzolo’s development 
would constitute a public nuisance, he had no right to develop the site as he has proposed. According-
ly, the State’s denial to permit such development cannot constitute a taking.”). 
 80 See id. at *25. 
 81 Id. at *26. 
 82 See id. at *29 (“Palazzolo has not shown any such legislative action in relation to the property 
in question. Nor has there been either express or implied state approval or acquiescence to the filling 
of tidal waters upon which [Palazzolo] has relied to his detriment.”). 
 83 Id. at *30 (“Although the public trust doctrine cannot be a total bar to recovery as to this tak-
ings claim, it substantially impacts [Palazzolo]’s title to the parcel in question and has a direct rela-
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Subsequently, the court concluded that the state’s invocation of the public 
trust doctrine did not rise to the level of a government action resembling a tak-
ing.84 The state’s denial of Palazzolo’s plans was not a physical taking, and its 
restriction on use constituted something akin to a partial regulatory taking.85 In 
addition, the public trust doctrine was not directed at Palazzolo in particular, as 
it impacted all owners of property along the marsh equally; the regulatory 
scheme’s legitimacy weakened Palazzolo’s claim that a taking of his property 
had occurred.86 
From there, the court considered the economic impact of the state’s denial 
on Palazzolo.87 Even with the assumption that the public trust doctrine did in 
fact diminish the value of Palazzolo’s property, the court explained that such a 
diminution in value does not itself give rise to a taking for which compensation 
is owed.88 Further, the court found Palazzolo’s monetary claims unconvinc-
ing.89 The court reasoned that Palazzolo would actually profit more if he were 
to develop the one lot on his property left untouched by the public trust doc-
trine and sell the lot with the undeveloped marsh, rather than develop it in the 
manner that he proposed.90 
Finally, the court evaluated Palazzolo’s reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations regarding his marsh property, concluding that Palazzolo’s reasona-
bly understood expectations were modest, at best.91 Here, the applicability of 
the public trust doctrine serves as a critical factor in the court’s analysis.92 Be-
cause half of his property was subject to the public trust doctrine, and because 
the state never modified or waived the development restrictions that applied to 
Palazzolo’s property by way of the public trust doctrine, Palazzolo never actu-
ally possessed the right to develop half of his property in the first place.93 Fur-
ther, both Palazzolo and the property’s previous owner, Urso, were seemingly 
aware of the land’s questionable value.94 As an attorney, Urso might have even 
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been aware of the public trust doctrine’s applicability to the parcel, yet he did 
not disclose that fact to Palazzolo in the sale.95 Even so, the court seemed unin-
terested in considering whether Palazzolo knew the public trust doctrine would 
be material in a takings analysis, and limited its discussion to whether the pub-
lic trust doctrine applied at all.96 Finding that the public trust doctrine applied, 
the court held that Palazzolo’s claim failed the third prong of the takings analy-
sis articulated in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York 
and Palazzolo’s claim collapsed.97 
Palazzolo’s lack of reasonable investment-backed expectations and the 
fact that the Coastal Resources Management Plan (“CRMP”) regulations did 
not bar him from constructing a dwelling on the upland portion of his property 
were key factors in the court’s decision in Palazzolo.98 At the core of this eval-
uation, however, was the court’s weighing of the testimony of several expert 
witnesses tasked with appraising the land’s value, who ultimately concluded 
that Palazzolo had not demonstrated a severe enough adverse economic impact 
to sustain a takings claim.99 Diminution in value is relevant for the purposes of 
determining the amount of compensation owed, assuming a taking has been 
proven.100 Yet, the Penn Central analysis is itself something of an ad hoc test, 
with the three prongs intended to serve as guideposts rather than strict ele-
ments.101 Thus, in a Penn Central takings analysis, a court is relatively free to 
consider anything that it might find relevant in determining whether a regula-
tion “goes too far,” which supports the conclusion that the Rhode Island Supe-
rior Court applied the test correctly.102 While none of the factors in the analysis 
are intended to be dispositive on their own—and the court did not claim in 
Palazzolo v. State that any one factor was in fact dispositive—the fact that 
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Palazzolo could not claim complete title to half of his land led the court to find 
little basis for any significant reasonable investment-backed expectations.103 
This finding thus framed the court’s discussion of the other two Penn Central 
factors.104 
In arguing that the denial of his development requests deprived him of all 
economically beneficial use of his land, Palazzolo’s takings claim rested upon 
the assumption that he owned the title to his entire marsh property at the out-
set.105 Indeed, any claim by Palazzolo asserting that the CRMP regulations 
took a portion of his property assumed that he possessed a right that could be 
taken at all.106 As the court later concluded, Palazzolo’s assumption of total 
ownership proved incorrect, as the state’s public trust doctrine gave the state, 
rather than Palazzolo, the right to determine whether the marsh would be de-
veloped.107 Given the fact that Palazzolo never truly possessed the full bundle 
of rights that he believed he did, it is difficult to say that the state’s prohibition 
on marsh development, absent approval, took anything from Palazzolo that 
would require compensation.108 
Framed a different way, the right to develop the marsh, and all economic 
benefit connected with it, never belonged to Palazzolo in the first place.109 
Even if the regulation caused the value of Palazzolo’s land to drop as much as 
ninety percent—potentially enough to favor a conclusion that a taking had oc-
curred—the existence of the CRMP regulations and associated lack of com-
plete title to the marshland would have been enough to provide ample warning 
to Palazzolo that his land held far less developmental value than he believed.110 
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this is that the vesting of owner-
ship of certain tracts of land in the public for the public’s benefit will be quite 
influential in a Penn Central analysis, even when one of the other factors may 
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point towards a different outcome.111 If anything, Palazzolo showcases the 
public trust doctrine as a powerful means of protection for certain tracts of en-
vironmentally or publicly significant land, capable of withstanding even chal-
lenges on constitutional grounds.112 
The court’s extended discussion vis-à-vis the alleged loss in value appears 
to be little more than a formality in practice, as mere diminution of value has 
not been viewed as sufficient to sustain a takings claim, with Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council being the only exception.113 The court hinted at this, 
opening its analysis with the evaluation of the regulation’s economic impact by 
noting that the formula for computing the correct amount of compensation is in 
no way enough to demonstrate that compensation is indeed owed.114 Moreover, 
the court’s conclusion with regard to the economic effects of the regulation on 
Palazzolo could hardly be construed as a surprise, as the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the earlier Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling that 
Palazzolo failed to establish a deprivation of all economic value.115 
CONCLUSION 
In light of Palazzolo’s murky title to the marshland, it may be tempting to 
view his decade-long quest in the courts as quixotic. What the final Palazzolo 
v. State decision more pointedly demonstrates, however, is the strength of the 
public trust doctrine. Even if we assume that Urso was aware of the public 
trust doctrine at the time of the sale of land to Palazzolo, it is not clear that Ur-
so made it known to Palazzolo that his land would be subject to the public trust 
doctrine or what the implications of that would be. Even if Urso was aware 
that the public trust doctrine applied and failed to disclose that fact, the court’s 
opinion does not seem to consider whether the claimant of a takings claim 
knew about restrictions to be material to the question of whether a compensa-
ble taking had occurred. The public trust doctrine may apply to a parcel—even 
if the owner is not aware of its existence—and bar the landowner from receiv-
ing compensation merely because of the public trust doctrine’s applicability. 
Therefore, it could certainly be said that the restrictions on development 
that accompanied the Coastal Resources Management Plan in 1976 made ex-
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plicit that which was implicit in the public trust doctrine. Had Palazzolo known 
about the limits that the public trust doctrine placed on his “bundle of rights” 
as the owner of the predominately marshland property, one might wonder 
whether the numerous rejections of his proposals would have come as such a 
surprise to Palazzolo that he felt compelled to file suit. While the Rhode Island 
Superior Court hints at the fact that Palazzolo knew that developing the land 
would be a proverbial “uphill battle” in the Palazzolo v. State decision, it is 
entirely possible that Palazzolo would have avoided purchasing the property 
from Urso in the first place had he known about the public’s ancient right to 
title in half of the marsh property. 
Given that there does not seem to be any requirement of sellers to notify 
potential buyers of beachfront property that a portion of their property might 
be subject to the public trust doctrine, it might make sense to bring the public 
trust doctrine out from the proverbial implicit “background” and require dis-
closure where it may apply. Indeed, had this been a requirement when Urso 
sold his property, the incident may have been avoided entirely, as Palazzolo 
would surely have been on notice of the issues relating to his title over the 
land. The public trust doctrine certainly serves the public’s interest in protect-
ing littoral land, and the Palazzolo v. State decision illustrates the tremendous 
hidden power of this ancient doctrine. 
